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During times of war, the relationship between International Humanitarian Law 
and International Human Rights Law has always been controversial, and has gene-
rally been solved by prioritizing the rules of the former and minimizing the appli-
cation of the latter’s. In practice, this has translated into insufficient standards of 
protection for individuals and, more specifically, into the endorsement of an un-
restrained right to kill enemy combatants. This paper suggests a novel approach to 
this regime interaction: the application of International Human Rights Law during 
wartime should serve as an interpretative tool of International Humanitarian Law 
rules, strengthening the safeguards offered by the latter and, thus, better respec-
ting the rights of individuals during hostilities. Regarding the right to life, this 
interpretation would require to abandon the idea of a right to kill opponents and, 
instead, demand that least harmful means be employed during military operations, 
when possible. Lethal force should be allowed only in cases where military necessity 
justifies it, henceforth avoiding causing individuals more harm than that strictly 
required. The purpose of this article is not to advocate for a prohibition of killing 
combatants -as the nature of armed conflicts would render that rule unattainable-; 
it is, however, to establish a principle capable of guiding combatants’ behaviour 
towards a more humane conduct of hostilities.  
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Una nueva perspectiva de interacción entre los Derechos 
Humanos y el Derecho Internacional Humanitario: el uso de 
medios menos nocivos como un principio que gobierna los 
conflictos armados
resuMen
Durante un conflicto armado, la interacción entre el Derecho Internacional Humanitario 
y el Derecho Internacional de los Derechos Humanos ha sido siempre controversial y, por 
lo general, ha sido resuelto priorizando las reglas derivadas del primero y minimizando 
la aplicación de las del segundo. En la práctica, esto se ha traducido en estándares 
insuficientes de protección a los individuos y, más específicamente, en la aceptación de 
un irrestricto derecho a matar de los combatientes hacia sus enemigos. No obstante, 
este artículo sugiere un enfoque novedoso de interacción entre estos dos regímenes: el 
Derecho Internacional de los Derechos Humanos debería servir como una herramienta 
de interpretación de las normas del Derecho Internacional Humanitario, con el fin de 
fortalecer el nivel de protección disponible en las normas de este último y lograr así la 
garantía efectiva de los derechos de los individuos durante las hostilidades. Con respecto 
al derecho a la vida, esta interpretación requeriría el abandono de la idea del derecho 
a matar y, en su lugar, requerir el uso de medios menos nocivos durante las operaciones 
militares, cuando sea posible. El recurrir a fuerza letal debería ser permitido únicamente 
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en aquellos casos en que la necesidad militar lo justifique, de manera que se evite causar 
a los individuos más daño del estrictamente requerido. El propósito de este artículo 
no es propugnar una prohibición absoluta de matar a los combatientes enemigos –
pues la naturaleza de los conflictos armados tornaría inalcanzable una regla de esas 
características–; sin embargo, sí es establecer un principio capaz de guiar la conducta de 
los combatientes hacia una conducción de hostilidades más humana. 
Palabras claVe
Derechos Humanos, Derecho Humanitario, interacción de los regímenes, medios menos 
nocivos, derecho a la vida, combatientes.
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1. introduction
International Humanitarian Law (onwards IHL) emerged in the 19th century, 
constituting one of the oldest manifestations of International Law, formulated to 
have the exclusive governance of armed conflicts1. During the aftermath of the 
Second World War in the late 50’s, however, another branch of International Law 
emerged as a response to the horrifying violations perpetrated during that period, 
with the intention to protect individuals’ dignity: International Human Rights 
Law (onwards IHRL)2. The emergence of IHRL marked a turning point for the 
rule of law governing armed conflicts, since IHL’s exclusive dominance was displa-
ced by the simultaneous application of the two regimes. Since then, the controversy 
has revolved around determining which is the model best suited to deal with the 
interaction of the two bodies of law and to accommodate both the humanitarian 
and military interests at stake. In the traditional models, military interests repre-
sented in IHL have prevailed at the expense of IHRL and have given way to in-
terpretations of the rules that allow for scarce protections in favour of individuals3, 
particularly combatants. 
During the last few decades, however, the growing expansion of IHRL in many 
fields within the international community has been undeniable4. The evidence is 
on the widespread ratification of existing treaties and the emergence of new ones, 
the creation of international bodies and procedures, among others5. Therefore, 
IHRL has turned into a guiding element of the conduct of states6. The consequen-
ce is that it demands the introduction of an IHL-IHRL interaction model that 
affords the latter a more substantive role in the regulation of hostilities, contrary to 
the prevailing view derived from the 1996 ICJ Nuclear Weapons judgment7 which 
is limited, in practice, to the displacement of the IHRL rules by IHL’s, arguing lex 
specialis8. Twenty years later, the interpretation presented in this judgement is no 
longer compliant with the IHRL obligations currently in place. 
Under the current scheme, individuals who act as combatants during an armed 
conflict have been partially divested of the rights to which they are inherently entit-
led9. What is more, the notion of an unconstrained right to kill enemy combatants 
1   Cfr. Fleck, Dieter. Handbook of IHL. OUP, 2013. Ch 1.
2   Cfr.Chevalier-Watts, Juliet. “Has human rights law become lex specialis for the European Court of Human Rights in right to 
life cases arising from internal armed conflicts?” (2010) IJHR 584 p. 3.
3   Cfr. Doswald-Beck, Louise. “The right to life in armed conflict: does international humanitarian law provide all the answers?” 
(2006) 88 IRRC 881 p. 2-3.
4   Lauren, Paul. The evolution of International Human Rights: Visions Seen. UPP, 2011; Pease, Kelly Kate and Forsythe, David. 
Human Rights, Humanitarian Intervention, and World Politics, Human Rights Quarterly, 1993. p. 6-9.
5   Ibíd. 
6  Ibíd. 
7   ICJ. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons. (Advisory Opinion), 1996. ICJ Rep 226.
8  Cfr. Doswald-Beck, Louise. “The right to life…” Óp cit., p. 2.
9  Cfr. May, Larry. “Humanity, Necessity and the Rights of soldiers” https://www.law.upenn.edu/live/files/3026-larry-
mayhumanity-necessity-and-the-rights-of (accessed: august 2016).
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has governed the conduct of hostilities10. In this paper, however, I will present a 
novel model of IHL-IHRL interaction that endorses a Least Harmful Means (on-
wards LHM) approach to be adopted during wartime, imposing on belligerents 
the obligation to rigorously adhere to the one legitimate aim of war: weakening the 
military forces of the enemy, which can be sufficiently fulfilled by “disabling the 
greatest possible number of men”11, without necessarily resorting to lethal force. 
For this purpose, the first section of this article will explain the model of interac-
tion proposed, the Integrative model, which places IHL as lex specialis, but uses 
IHRL protective principles to shine through IHL rules, in search of the most hu-
manitarian interpretation of the latter. This exercise gives IHRL a central role in 
the regulation of hostilities, amending one of the most criticised flaws of the clas-
sic model and better reflecting the prominent status of this regime. The second 
section will focus on the protection of the right to life of combatants afforded by 
IHRL and by IHL, and will analyse the regime interaction models that have been 
employed by the different courts on this matter. The purpose of this section is to 
suggest a more appropriate and protective way of reading the right to life during 
armed conflicts. Finally, the last section will detail how, under the light of the 
Integrative model, a LHM approach can be construed to govern the conduct of 
hostilities, by using the protective principles of IHRL to boost the humanitarian 
rules12 already found in IHL -but often disregarded-, and result in restrictions on 
the use of force against combatants. 
2. interaction between iHl and iHrl: tHe inteGratiVe Model
IHRL and IHL were created under distinct rationales, especially regarding origin, 
nature and specific purpose13, but there is broad evidence of the important over-
laps between the two regimes that demand their simultaneous application during 
wartime and, moreover, that deem it convenient14. First, there are substantive 
conceptual similarities shared by the two bodies of law, especially regarding their 
protective drive and the field of application15. They both pursue a similar huma-
nitarian aim and this provokes, in the words of the Inter-American Commission 
on Human Rights (onwards IACHR), “an integral linkage” between the two, 
based on the “common purpose of protecting human life and dignity’”16. Fur-
10   Cfr. Parks, Hays. “Part IX of the ICRC ‘Direct Participation in Hostilities’ Study: No Mandate, No Expertise, and Legally 
Incorrect”, (2010) 42 NYU J Int’l L & Politics 794.; Watkin, Kenneth. “Humans in the Cross- Hairs: Targeting, Assassination 
and Extra-Legal Killing in Contemporary Armed Conflict”, in Wippman, David and Evangelista, Matthew. New Wars, New 
Laws? applying the laws of war in the 21st century conflicts. Brill, 2005 p. 137-179. 
11  St. Petersburg Declaration Renouncing the Use, in Time of War, of Explosive Projectiles Under 400 Grammes Weight LXIV 
UKPP (1869) 659. 
12  High Court of Justice Israel, The Public Committee against Torture in Israel et al v The Government of Israel et al (Targeted 
Killings), 46 ILM 375, (11 December 2006) para. 40.
13  Cfr. Gasser, Hans Peter. “International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights Law in Non-International Armed Conflicts: 
Joint Venture or Mutual Exclusion?” (2002) 45 GYIL p. 160-161.
14   Cfr. Heintze, Hans-Joachim. “On the relationship between human rights law protection and international humanitarian law” 
(2004) 86 IRRC 789 p. 1-5.
15  Ibíd.
16  IACHR, Coard v US, Report no 109/99 (29 September 1999) para. 39.
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thermore, while it is true that IHL operates only during wartime, IHRL’s core 
idea is that rights are permanently protected because they are inherent to human 
condition and not dependant on states’ willingness/capacity to recognize them17; 
hence, during an armed conflict when rights are specially at risk, its protection 
cannot vanish18. Thus, IHRL pertains to both times of peace and times of war 
and this deems the IHL-IHRL interaction unavoidable. 
Stipulations in IHRL treaties also further this view through the text of the de-
rogation-clauses, which endorses the applicability of certain rights during times 
of emergency -including situations of armed conflict19. In this regard, although 
there are some rights that may be derogated by states during these times, the 
rights considered part of the “common nucleus of Human Rights”20 such as life, 
integrity or freedom of belief, remain binding even during hostilities. The non-
derogable character of these rights has been ratified by vast jurisprudence of in-
ternational judicial bodies21, concluding that they continue to be enforceable at 
all times without exception and, thus, rejecting allegations of exclusive applicabi-
lity of IHL during wartime.
Furthermore, more recent developments in IHL regulations have themselves en-
dorsed, tacitly and expressly, the applicability of IHRL to hostilities. First, Com-
mon Art. 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions (onwards GCs)22 provides a list of 
rights that ought to be protected at all times which coincides with the list of non-
derogable rights specified in IHRL instruments, mirroring the similar drive of the 
two bodies of law23. Second, the 1977 Additional Protocols (onwards APs) ack-
nowledge the application of IHRL more directly by stating that their provisions 
“are additional to […] other applicable rules of international law relating to the 
protection of fundamental human rights during international armed conflict”24. 
Moreover, the Martens Clause contained in the APs expressly states that in cases 
not covered by IHL, individuals “remain under the protection and authority of the 
principles of international law derived from established custom, from the principles 
of humanity and from the dictates of public conscience”25. As stated by Heintze, 
17  Cfr. Griffin, James. On Human Rights. OUP, 2009. Ch 2.
18  Cfr. Milanovic, Marco. “Norm Conflicts, International Humanitarian Law, and Human Rights Law” p. 7 in Ben-Naftali, 
Orna, International Humanitarian Law and International Human Rights Law. Oxford University Press, 2011.
19  International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 999 UNTS 171 (ICCPR) Art. 4; American Convention on Human 
Rights 1144 UNTS 123 (ACHR) Art. 27; Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 213 
UNTS 222 (ECHR) Art. 15. 
20  IACHR, Coard v US… Óp. cit., para. 38. 
21  ICJ, Nuclear Weapons… Óp. cit., para. 25; ICJ, Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian 
Territory (Advisory Opinion) [2004] ICJ Rep 136 para. 106; ECtHR, Hassan v United Kingdom App no 29750/09 (16 
September 2014) para 77.
22  Geneva Conventions (adopted 12 August 1949) 75 UNTS (GCs).
23  Cfr. Heintze, Hans-Joachim. “On the relationship…” Óp. cit., p. 2. 
24  Additional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed 
Conflicts 1125 UNTS 3 (API) Art. 72; Sandoz, Yves et al. Commentary on the Additional Protocols. ICRC, 1987. para. 4429.  
25   Additional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International 
Armed Conflicts Art. 1; Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of 
Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts 1125 UNTS 609 (APII), Preamble.
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these clauses confirm the openness of IHL by recognizing that its rules “cannot be 
regarded as the final regulation of the protection of human beings [during armed 
conflicts]”, but are meant to be complemented with others, such as IHRL’s26. 
Consequently, there can be no doubt that International Law in its current form 
endorses the joint applicability of IHRL during armed conflicts, hence why this 
view has been progressively endorsed by states within the UN. Initially, specific 
declarations were made regarding the application of IHRL during determined 
wars, including the URSS invasion of Hungary in 195627 and the Six Day War in 
196728. This trend led later to the elaboration of general documents confirming 
the application of IHRL during armed conflicts overall, such as the resolution on 
“Basic principles for the protection of civilian populations in armed conflict”29; 
view that has been maintained onwards in UN resolutions issued by the Security 
Council30 and the General Assembly31. 
IHRL applicability changes significantly the approach employed by the rule of 
law to address armed conflicts, injecting a more humanitarian outlook. While 
IHL consists of a series of state-centred agreements between states who, on the 
basis of sovereignty and reciprocity, accepted to restrain their actions and mini-
mize damage, the humanity-driven rationale behind IHRL gives priority to hu-
man needs and conceptualizes individuals as right-holders who need reinforced 
safeguards during wartime32. Accordingly, IHRL effectively expands the humani-
tarian purposes established in IHL and lifts the standards of available protection. 
2.1. tHe inteGratiVe Model
Although today there is general agreement on the simultaneous application of 
IHL and IHRL, the dynamic of the interrelation between the two is still subject 
to much debate. At times, rules from both bodies of law will be compatible and 
the solution will simply be to apply each in its own terms33. Often, however, 
applicable IHL and IHRL rules can be contradictory and this adds complexity to 
the interaction. The issue of how to reconcile opposing standards of protection, 
therefore, needs to be addressed through a carefully tailored mechanism.  
The starting point to construct an appropriate model is the assumption that Inter-
national Law, along with all of its branches, are part of one coherent and unified 
26 Heintze, Hans-Joachim. “On the relationship…” Óp. cit., p. 9.
27 GA Res. 1312 (XIII) (12 December 1958) UN Doc. A/38/49.
28  SC Res. 237 (14 June 1967) UN Doc. A/237/1967.
29  GA Res. 2675 (XXV) (9 December 1970).  
30  SC Res. 1019 (9 November 1995) UN Doc. S/RES/1019; SC Res. 1635 (28 October 2005) UN Doc. S/RES/1635 and SC 
Res. 1653 (27 January 2006) UN Doc. S/RES/1653. 
31 GA Res. 46/135 (19 December 1991) UN Doc. A/RES/ 46/135; GA Res. 50/193 (22 December 1995) UN Doc. A/
RES/50/193; GA Res. 52/145 (12 December 1997) UN Doc. A/RES/52/145.
32 Cfr. Milanovic, Marco. “Norm Conflicts…” Óp. cit., p. 1-2.
33  ICJ, Palestinian Wall… Óp. cit., para. 106. 
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system and not an aggregate of unconnected norms that operate independently34. 
This systemic approach is endorsed by Art. 31 of the Vienna Convention on 
the Law of Treaties, which states that “any relevant rules of international law 
applicable in the relations between the parties” shall be taken into account in the 
interpretation of any international treaty35. Hence, all bodies of law applicable 
in a determined situation are expected to be interpreted against the background 
of one another in a harmonic manner, resulting in a “single set of compatible 
obligations” that states are bound to observe36. Harmonization between IHL and 
IHRL should be feasible, considering their partial convergence and, thus, their 
potential to reinforce one another37.  
Nevertheless, finding a mechanism capable of reconciling these rules has proven 
to be a challenge. The general trend has been to solve these difficulties through 
interpretative means and, more specifically, by interpreting IHRL in light of 
IHL38. This model is built upon the idea that, due to the extraordinary circum-
stances surrounding war, IHRL obligations can be attenuated and read through 
the lenses of IHL norms, by expanding the former only to the extent of matching 
the requirements of the latter. This model frames IHL as lex specialis and, moreo-
ver, as an authoritative interpretation of IHRL39. For instance, in the Coard v US 
case, the IACHR had to analyse whether a detention within an armed conflict 
had been arbitrary under IHRL and it resolved that the standard of what should 
be understood as arbitrary ought to be deduced by reference to IHL40. Under 
this approach, only when a deprivation of a right is illegal under IHL, it is also 
assumed to be an IHRL violation. 
This model, however, presents both theoretical and practical problems. First, 
even though it is supposed to be based on the idea of IHRL applicability, in re-
ality it contradicts it, since it prevents this regime from actually influencing the 
regulation of hostilities. In practice, the relevant IHL norm is applied exclusively 
and displaces the IHRL one, by disregarding any higher standard that the latter 
may impose. As was explained previously, IHL-IHRL interaction should give 
way to a single set of compatible obligations shaped by both applicable regimes; 
instead, this model endorses IHL as the only rule in force and condemns IHRL 
to be a silent bystander, only permitted to reinforce its counterpart’s standards.  
Consequently, this paper advocates for an alternative model: the Integrative one. Its 
aim is to further the role played by IHRL, encouraging active interaction between 
34  ILC, Conclusions of the work of the Study Group on the Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties arising from the 
Diversification and Expansion of International Law (2006) UN Doc A/61/10. 
35   Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 11 UNTS 331 (VCLT) Art. 31.3.c.
36   ILC, Conclusions of the work of… Óp. cit., p. 1.
37  Cfr. Doswald-Beck, Louise. “The right to life…” Óp. cit., p.1.
38   ICJ, Nuclear Weapons… Óp. cit., para. 25; ECtHR, Hassan v UK… op. cit. paras. 100-106; IACHR, Coard v US...  Óp. cit., para. 42.
39 IACHR, Coard v US… Óp. cit., para. 42.
40  Ibíd. 
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the two bodies of law and acknowledging the contribution that IHRL can make 
to the regulation of war. More specifically, this model intends to inject a more 
humane perspective, by allowing IHRL to lift the standards available in IHL. Just 
as in the current model, here IHL rules are considered lex specialis due to their spe-
cificity, but the difference is that IHRL is meant to play an interpretative function 
and “remain in the background to inform the application and interpretation of 
the relevant humanitarian law rule[s]”41. Even though IHRL norms will not apply 
directly, its protective values will inspire the way in which IHL is read, so as to bear 
the most humanitarian result possible within the latter’s own framework. 
2.1.1. Historical justiFication oF tHe inteGratiVe Model
Since its emergence, IHRL was intended to apply during armed conflicts sub-
ject to the restrictions contained in the derogation clauses. However, because 
of the immaturity and limited scope of IHRL in its early stages, initially there 
was reluctance to endorse its application during wartime42. Through time, IHRL 
obligations expanded and, thusly, this older view became unsustainable. As a 
result, in the following decades IHRL application started to be recognized and 
the first steps towards IHL-IHRL interaction were made. Today, however, IHRL 
has developed even more and is seen by many as one of the pillars upon which 
the international community is built43, which requires its role during war to be 
further strengthened. 
IHLR’s importance grew significantly in the first period following its emergen-
ce. This can be evidenced, for example, through the wide spread ratification of 
treaties, such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (on-
wards ICCPR) (1966) and the International Covenant on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights (onwards ICESCR) (1966); and later of other more spe-
cific instruments focused on women (1979), children (1989), torture(1984), 
migration (1990), etc44. Additionally, in this same stage, states agreed to the 
creation of monitoring bodies both with jurisdictional45 and non-jurisdictional 
powers46, in order to ensure compliance with IHRL obligations. The large sup-
port given to all these new agreements within the international community 
progressively placed IHRL as a priority subject matter, compelling states to 
shape their conduct in accordance with the latter’s requirements47. As expected, 
41 Report of the un Fact-Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict (25 September 2009) UN Doc A/HCR/12/48 para. 296.
42   Cfr. Meyrowitz, Henri. “Le droit de la guerre et les droit de l’homme” (1972) 88 Revue du droit public et de la science 
politique en France et à l’étranger 1059.
43   Cfr. UN World Summit Outcome Report (24 October 2005) UN Doc. A/RES/60/1.
44   Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women (adopted 18 December 1979) 1249 UNTS 13 
(CEDAW); Convention on the Rights of the Child (adopted 20 November 1989) 1577 UNTS 3 (CRC); Convention Against 
Torture (adopted 10 December 1984); 1465 UNTS 85 (CAT); International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of 
All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families (18 December 1990) 2220 UNTS 3.
45   ECHR; ACHR.
46   Human Rights Committee (1966); Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1966); Committee on the 
Elimination of Discrimination against Women (1979); Committee against Torture (1984).
47  Cfr. Pease, Kelly Kate and Forsythe, David. “Human Rights, Humanitarian…” Óp. cit., p. 6-9.
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this development made inevitable acknowledging its application during armed 
conflicts and the classic model of interpreting IHRL in the light of IHL emer-
ged. The latter has been consistently employed since the 90s to address the inte-
raction between these two regimes. Admittedly, this model probably allowed as 
much IHRL intervention in the regulation of hostilities as was feasible within 
the context prevailing at the time. 
IHRL obligations, nonetheless, have furthered even more during the last couple 
of decades and the protagonist function that it has acquired within the interna-
tional community, requires a new model of IHL-IHRL interaction that mirrors 
this advancement48. The most significant IHRL developments include: emergen-
ce of new regional treaties and monitoring bodies in Asia and Africa49; creation 
of new universal bodies within the structure of the UN, such as the Human 
Rights Council50; acquiescence of states to the implementation of the Universal 
Periodic Review as a mandatory monitoring mechanism51; creation of the Inter-
national Criminal Court to punish the most heinous violations of IHRL52; and 
proliferation of new treaties and protocols to further the protection offered to 
individuals53. IHRL’s progress has even challenged some of the traditional con-
ceptions prevailing in International Law, including jurisdiction and sovereignty. 
Regarding the first one, it was traditionally assumed that a state was bound to 
safeguard individuals’ rights only when it had jurisdiction over them, and this 
concept was intrinsically linked to a territorial element. In the last few years, 
however, extraterritoriality has turned into a feature of IHRL obligations, expan-
ding its scope to the actions undertaken by states abroad54. In the same way, the 
classic state-centred definition of sovereignty has been challenged by IHRL and 
has developed into a more humanity-driven notion that requires states to respect 
individual rights as a primary condition for their legitimacy55. 
48   Cfr. Chevalier-Watts, Juliet. “Has human rights law…” Óp. cit., p. 3-5.
49   ASEAN Intergovernmental commission on Human Rights (2009) and ASEAN Human Rights Declaration (adopted 18 
november 2012) Association of Southeast Asian Nations; Arab Human Rights Committee and Court and Arab Charter 
on Human Rights (adopted 15 september 1994) League of Arab States; African Court of Human and People’s Rights and 
Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa (13 September 2000) 
African Union CAB/LEG/66.6.
50   GA Resol. 265 (15 March 2006) UN Doc A/RES/60/251.
51   Ibíd.
52   Rome Statue of the International Criminal Court (adopted 17 July 1998) 2187 UNTS 3. 
53   Optional protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the involvement of children in armed conflict (adopted 25 
May 2000) 2173 UNTS 222; Optional protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the sale of children, child 
prostitution and child pornography (adopted 25 May 2000) 2173 UNTS 222; Optional Protocol to the Convention Against 
Torture (adopted 18 December 2002) 2375 UNTS 273; International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from 
Enforced Disappearance (adopted 20 December 2006) 2716 UNTS 3; Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities 
(adopted on 13 December 2006) 2515 UNTS 3 (CRPD); Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities (adopted 13 December 2006) 2518 UNTS 283; Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights (adopted 10 December 2008); Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on 
a communications procedure (adopted 19 December 2011). 
54  ICJ, Palestinian Wall… Óp. cit., paras. 103-113; ECtHR, Al-Skeini and others v UK, App no 55721/07 (ECtHR, 7 July 2011) 
paras. 109 –150; Jaloud v. Netherlands, App no. 47708/08 (ECtHR, 20 November 2014) paras. 139-156; Cfr. King, Hugh 
“The extraterritorial Human Rights Obligations of States” (2009) 9 Human Rights Law Review 521.
55   Cfr. 2005 World Summit... Óp. cit.
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All these changes were caused by the undeniable growth of IHRL and conse-
quently, the model employed for the IHL-IHRL interaction should progress at 
the same pace. In my view, the Integrative model is a progressive one that better 
achieves this aim. 
2.1.2. eleMents oF tHe Model
2.1.2.1. Lex speciaLis
In order to build a solid interpretative solution to resolve the issue of conflicting 
rules, it is first necessary to determine which one of the regimes shall be given 
the primary role. For this purpose, the maxim lex specialis derogat legi generali 
established by International Law provides the best mechanism. This principle is a 
Roman rule of interpretation according to which the norm that is more specific 
to the situation at stake is given priority, since it is assumed is better suited to 
address the circumstance and create a more appropriate result56. As Milanovic 
has explained, however, lex specialis in this case should not be understood as a 
principle of conflict-resolution aiming to apply solely the special rule and displa-
ce the general one; instead, this maxim should operate as a conflict-avoidance 
norm, which pursues a joint interpretation of the two rules, in application of the 
systemic principle mentioned above57. The primary regime, thus, applies directly 
to the scenario, but the secondary one guides the latter’s interpretation. 
In the case at stake, IHL is the primary body of law since it was specifically formu-
lated to regulate the conduct of hostilities and tailored to address its particularities. 
Considering that an armed conflict constitutes an extraordinary circumstance with 
unique features, it requires context-sensitive solutions that can be better generated 
by IHL. This view has been consistently maintained by the ICJ58, and has been fo-
llowed by other international bodies, such as the IACHR59 and the HRC60. IHRL, 
thus, should be afforded the secondary interpretative function.
2.1.2.2. tHe role oF iHrl: interPretation oF iHl rules
IHL norms constitute a minimum threshold of protection below which the rule 
of law cannot be set61. When applying IHL rules, however, several interpretative 
possibilities may arise. Under the model proposed, the possibility that is most 
protective and that best complies with an IHRL’s approach should be selected. 
56   Cfr. ILC, Conclusions of the work… Óp. cit., p. 2.
57  Milanovic, Marco. “Norm Conflicts…” Óp. cit., p. 10-11.
58  ICJ, Nuclear Weapons… Óp. cit., para. 25; ICJ, Palestinian Wall… Óp. cit., para. 106.
59   IACHR, Coard v US.. Óp. cit., para. 42.  
60   HRC General Comment No. 31 on The nature of the general legal obligation imposed on States Parties to the Covenant (26 
May 2004) UN Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13 para. 11. 
61   Cfr. Rusinova, Vera. “The right to life in light of the integration between the norms of International Humanitarian and Human 
Rights Law” http://www.hse.ru/data/2014/05/12/1321656524/38LAW2014.pdf (accessed: July 2016). 
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This way IHRL principles will still be present by inspiring the interpretation of 
the rules that do apply, so as to achieve an outcome that respects the rights of 
individuals to the highest attainable standard. 
This model proposes a balanced solution that weighs all the interests at stake, by 
avoiding illusory Human-Rightist approaches that ignore the realities of armed 
conflicts. Certainly the intention of applying IHRL is to raise the standards of 
protection in favour of individuals62, but it should be observed that the circum-
stances surrounding war differ significantly from those governing peace-time, 
and include high degrees of violence, politically-sensitive contexts and military-
focused decision-making processes. These complexities limit the protection that 
can realistically be afforded to individuals and will inevitably result in “watered 
down” IHRL standards63. That is why the integrative approach proves to be a 
suitable one: unlike other new models proposed64, it does not intend to directly 
apply IHRL rules in the battlefield but, instead, allow IHL rules to govern, as 
was initially intended. 
On the other hand, this model is mindful that IHRL standards should not be 
attenuated excessively, to the point of annulling the values that it stands for. If 
this happened, IHRL would be at the risk of simply being diluted and replica-
te the problems identified in the current model. Furthermore, unduly watering 
down IHRL obligations, could potentially open the door for claims in support 
of attenuated duties during peace time, which could debilitate the IHRL regime 
overall65. Consequently, through the approach proposed, the IHL-IHRL interac-
tion would be addressed through a well-balanced interpretation. States will not 
have unattainable duties to pursue, but will be forced to modify its conduct in 
ways that are respectful of human dignity, even in the battlefield.  
3. tHe riGHt to liFe under tHe inteGratiVe Model
Today, it is assumed as one of IHRL’s basic premises that every individual is en-
titled to human rights on the basis of the universality principle66 and they remain 
valid for all, with or without an armed conflict67. This principle becomes even 
more relevant when dealing with the right to life, due to its inherent importance. 
Life is the most precious asset that an individual has, because his entire existence 
is dependent on it and it is a necessary condition for every other aspect of human 
62   Cfr. Milanovic, Marco. “Norm Conflicts…” Óp. cit., p. 3.
63   Ibíd. 
64   Cfr. Doswald-Beck, Louise. “The right to life…” Óp. cit.; Droege, Cordula. “Elective affinities? Human rights and 
humanitarian law” (2008) 90 IRRC 501; Sassoli, Marco and Olson, Laura “The relationship between international 
humanitarian and human rights law where it matters: admissible killing and internment of fighters in non-international armed 
conflicts” (2008) 90 IRRC 599.   
65   Cfr. Milanovic, Marco. “Norm Conflicts…” Óp. cit., p. 4.
66   Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) UNGA Res 217 A(III), UN Doc A/810 91 (UDHR) Preamble.
67  Cfr. Milanovic, Marco. “Norm Conflicts…” Óp. cit., p. 7
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development68. Likewise, the right to life is the foundation upon which all other 
rights are construed and, accordingly, its violation constitutes an especially hei-
nous breach of IHRL69.
Because of its transcendence, the contrasts between the standards of protection 
of life under IHRL and under IHL become especially relevant. From a broad 
perspective, the standard set in IHL is significantly lower and more flexible than 
that of IHRL, legitimizing deprivations of life that during peacetime would be 
unacceptable70. This chapter will compare the standards of protection offered by 
both regimes, will analyse how other models have dealt with the issue, and will 
propose an alternative solution in light of the integrative model.
3.1. iHrl: tHe Protection oF tHe riGHt to liFe 
In IHRL, the right to life is protected extensively by all major instruments. In 
the ICCPR, the American Convention on Human Rights (onwards ACHR) and 
the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights (onwards ACHPR), the right 
to life is framed as an entitlement of every individual and is also characterized as 
a non-derogable right71. The only qualifier available within the wording of the 
relevant provisions is that arbitrary deprivations of life are prohibited. Hence, 
non-arbitrary acts that result in the death of an individual are allowed. The term 
arbitrary, however, is generally understood in a far-reaching manner and has been 
defined as an unlawful act that has no legal basis to be undertaken or one that, 
even if lawful, is unnecessary/disproportionate72. 
The European Convention on Human Rights (onwards ECHR), meanwhile, gi-
ves more detail on the matter and, while ensuring the right overall, it expressly 
establishes the exceptions when deprivations of life can be acceptable. Art. 15 
of the ECHR establishes that those that result from “the use of force which is 
no more than absolutely necessary: (a) in defence of any person from unlawful 
violence; (b) in order to effect a lawful arrest or to prevent the escape of a person 
lawfully detained; (c) in action lawfully taken for the purpose of quelling a riot 
or insurrection” do not constitute a breach73. Consequently, here there is no space 
for discretion since the convention itself states what the acceptable deprivations 
of life are, and it tacitly excludes any other possibility not mentioned. When dea-
ling with times of emergency, on the other hand, the ECHR considers the right 
to life as a non-derogable one, “except in respect of deaths resulting from lawful 
68   Cfr. Wicks, Elizabeth. The Right to Life and Conflicting Interests. Oxford Scholarship, 2010. Ch1.
69   Ibid; IACtHR, Santo Domingo Massacre v Colombia No. N. 12.416 (30 November 2012) para. 190.
70   Cfr. Doswald-Beck, Louise. “The right to life…” Óp. cit., p. 2.
71   International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Arts. 4, 6; American Convention on Human Rights Art. 27; African 
Charter on Human’s and People’s Rights. 1520 UNTS 217 (ACHPR) does not have a derogation clause.
72   Cfr. Wicks, Elizabeth. The Right to Life and… Óp. cit., Ch1.
73   European Convention on Human Rights. Art. 2.
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acts of war”74. The definition of what a lawful act is, however, should include 
both IHRL and IHL relevant rules. 
In sum, all IHRL treaties offer a high-standard protection of the right to life, 
seeking to safeguard it as a supreme value and based on the presumption that 
every individual’s right is deserving of permanent protection, regardless of perso-
nal circumstances like the function he performs75. What is more, this protection 
does not cease in times of war76. In the specific case of the use of force, all IHRL 
instruments address it expressly or tacitly as a possible exception to the protection 
of the right to life. However, in order for it to be deemed legal, the amount of 
force used cannot exceed what is strictly necessary and proportionate to obtain 
a legitimate objective, like self-defence or the defence of others against an immi-
nent threat, to prevent a serious crime with potential lethal results, or to arrest a 
person or prevent his escape77. Additionally, IHRL requires that other preventive 
measures are undertaken to protect life such as giving a warning in advance, 
granting the opportunity to surrender and exhausting non-violent means pre-
viously78. Thus, a LHM approach can be identified, requiring that lethal force is 
employed as a last-resort measure whilst other alternatives are exhausted first79. 
3.1.1. extraterritoriality oF HuMan riGHts
Although the protection of IHRL and, more specifically the right to life, remain 
in force during an armed conflict, there is one element of this regime’s structure 
that could inhibit its application overall: jurisdiction. All IHRL treaties establish 
that a state is bound to ensure rights only to individuals that are subject to its 
jurisdiction80 and, traditionally, the latter has been linked mainly to the territory 
of the state81. Under this scheme, a state was bound to protect the rights of indi-
viduals within their borders and, only exceptionally, the rights of persons abroad 
if it had the consent, invitation or acquiescence of the territorial state82. This 
understanding was rooted in the classic definition of jurisdiction of International 
Law but, as Milanovic has explained, they constitute two different concepts83. 
International Law’s Jurisdiction is a complex notion dealing with prescriptive, 
adjudicative and enforcement elements which require total sovereign control 
over a territory, whilst IHRL’s simply refers to the de facto relationship between 
74   European Convention on Human Rights. Art. 15.
75  Cfr. May, Larry. “Humanity, Necessity and the Rights…” Óp. cit. 
76   ICJ, Nuclear Weapons… Óp. cit., para. 25; ICJ, Palestinian Wall… Óp. cit., para. 106; ECHR, Hassan v UK… Óp. cit., para. 77.
77  Cfr. Kleffner, Jann. “Section IX of the ICRC Interpretative Guidance on Direct Participation on hostilities: The end of Jus in 
Bello proportionality as we know it?” (2012) 45 ILR 35 p. 14
78   Ibíd; Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials, GA Res. 45/121 (14 December 1990), 
Principles 4, 5, 9.
79   Cfr. Doswald-Beck, Louise. “The right to life…” Óp. cit., p. 2-5; Kleffner, Jann. “Section IX of the ICRC…” Óp. cit., p. 15; 
Melzer, Nils.‘Targeted Killing or Less Harmful Means? – Israel’s High Court Judgment on Targeted Killing and the Restrictive 
Function of Military Necessity’, 9 YIHL 87 (2006) p. 3-6.
80   International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Art. 2; ACHR. Art. 1; European Convention on Human Rights. Art. 1.
81  ECtHR, Bankovic and others v Belgium App 52207/99 (12 December 2001) paras. 59-61.
82  Ibídem.
83  Cfr. Milanovic, Marco. Extraterritorial Application of HR Treaties: Law, principles and Policy OUP, 2011. Ch 1.
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an individual and the state, and the consequent humanitarian obligations that 
are triggered as a result84.
The issue of IHRL’s jurisdiction started to be clarified by the ICJ as early as 1971 
in the South Africa v Namibia Advisory Opinion85 and was later furthered by the 
2004 Palestinian Wall judgement86, when the court affirmed that a legitimate title 
over a territory abroad was not necessary to trigger IHRL obligations and that, 
although this kind of  jurisdiction was primarily found within state’s boarders, 
it would be mistaken to interpret rules in a manner that allow states to escape 
their IHRL’s responsibilities when acting abroad. In these judgements, the ICJ 
endorsed the extraterritorial character of IHRL’s jurisdiction while distinguishing 
it from that of International Law. 
In the early stages, courts only accepted effective overall control over foreign 
territory as a valid source of extraterritorial jurisdiction87, which is known as 
the territorial model. In time, nonetheless, they progressively came to accept 
state’s factual power over an individual also as a valid source of jurisdiction, 
the personal model88. When extraterritoriality is configured on the basis of the 
former, it is triggered by the effective control of a territory overall or control 
over some of the relevant public powers of that territory, through military oc-
cupation or through the consent of the state89. This kind of model generates 
not only negative obligations but also positive ones90. In the case of the right 
to life, the first type of obligations involves refraining from any deprivations of 
this right through the state’s own agents, whist positive obligations imply the 
duty to prevent violations perpetrated by third parties.
In respect of the personal model, however, the requirements for obligations to be 
triggered are more complex. There are two ways of configuring this model and 
bringing victims under the jurisdiction of the state: first, through acts perpetrated 
by diplomatic authorities and, second, through the use of force by states’ agents 
in foreign soil91. In respect of the latter which is the one that concerns this paper, 
jurisdiction is triggered by the factual power that a state acting abroad has over 
an individual through its agents. Although it is still very debated within the legal 
doctrine, this understanding of the personal model is what King calls the cause-
and-effect notion92. In the case of the right to life, if a state agent has the power 
84   Cfr.  King, Hugh “The extraterritorial Human Rights…” Óp. cit., p. 32-36.  
85  ICJ, Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) notwithstanding 
Security Council Resolution 276 (1970) (Advisory Opinion) [1971] ICJ Rep 16 para. 118.
86  ICJ, Palestinian Wall… Óp. cit., para. 109.
87  Ibid; ICJ, South West Africa… Óp. cit., para. 118, ECtHR, Loizidou v Turkey, App no 15318/89 (1996) para. 56; ECtHR, 
Cyprus v Turkey App no 25781/94 (EctHR, 2001) paras. 75, 77; ECtHR, Bankovic and others v Belgium Óp. cit., paras. 67, 71, 
80; IACHR, Coard v US.. Óp. cit., para. 37.
88  ECtHR, Al-Skeini and others... Óp. cit.,  para. 135, 142.
89 Ibid.; ECtHR, Bankovic and others… Óp. cit., paras. 60, 71.
90  Cfr. Milanovic, Marco. Extraterritorial Application… Óp. cit. Ch 1.
91  ECtHR, Al-Skeini and others... Óp. cit.,  para. 134
92  Cfr. King, Hugh “The extraterritorial Human Rights Obligations… Óp. cit., p. 36.
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to kill an individual or uses a weapon against him, that should suffice to bring the 
target within the jurisdiction of that state93. It would be excessive to establish addi-
tional requirements like physical apprehension or custody of the individual before 
the obligations regarding this right can be triggered. The right to life is the basis of 
human existence but is very fragile and can be irreversibly affected from afar; thus, 
the fact that the victim is in custody of a state or not is irrelevant when assessing a 
breach of this sort and, setting that as a requirement, would only hinder the access 
of the victims to a remedy, contradicting the protective nature of IHRL94. 
The right to life under the IHRL regime, thus, remains as a binding obligation 
for states acting abroad in the context of an armed conflict because of the extra-
territorial character of IHRL jurisdiction. Whether it is through the territorial 
or through the personal model depending on the case, states shall refrain from 
depriving individuals of their right to life through the actions of their agents. 
Evidently this obligation needs to be harmonized with IHL relevant rules as was 
explained in the previous chapter but, overall, IHRL protective principles remain 
valid and they do not make distinctions between individuals. 
3.2. iHl: tHe Protection oF tHe riGHt to liFe 
IHL regime is a status-based system that categorizes individuals either as comba-
tants or as civilians95. In general terms, combatants are those who belong to the 
armed forces of a state96 or those who belong to any other armed groups which 
fulfil the four requirements given by Art. 4.2 of the III GC: responsible com-
mand, fixed distinctive sign, carrying arms openly and complying with IHL97. 
Civilians, on the other hand, are defined in the negative as any person who is 
not a combatant98 and who are entitled to protection from attacks, unless they 
directly participate in hostilities99. 
There are important differences between the protection of the right to life offered by 
IHL to each of the categories of individuals, but this paper will focus on the safe-
guards established in favour of combatants. Pursuant to Art. 43 of the API, comba-
tants have the right to directly participate in hostilities, which should be understood 
as performing acts specifically aimed at affecting the enemy’s military capacity, with 
a direct casual link and with a belligerent intent100. Therefore, the role that a com-
batant performs is dangerous and is characterized by armed attacks and high levels 
of violence. That is probably why IHL does not establish many provisions regarding 
93 Cfr. Milanovic, Marco. Extraterritorial Application… Óp. cit., Ch 1. 
94   Cfr. King, Hugh “The extraterritorial Human Rights Obligations… Óp. cit., p. 35.
95   High Court of Justice Israel, Targeted killings… Óp. cit., paras. 27-28.
96   III Geneva Convention. Art. 4.1. 
97   III Geneva Convention. Art. 4.2.
98   Additional Protocol I. Art. 50. 
99   Additional Protocol I. Art. 51.
100  ICRC, Interpretative Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities under International Humanitarian Law. ICRC, 
2009. p. 47-58.
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protections of the right to life in favour of combatants and the safeguards availa-
ble operate mostly under extraordinary circumstances, for instance, when they have 
been captured and acquired the status of Prisoners of War101 or when they are found 
hors de combat102. However, combatants who are not under any of these circumstan-
ces, do not have express provisions protecting their right to life and, therefore, it has 
been traditionally assumed that lethal force can be used against them unrestrictedly. 
Nonetheless, IHL provisions do not prescribe a combatant’s right to kill enemy 
fighters nor do they set the grounds for when such killing could be deemed 
lawful103. Although it has been long assumed that this right is implicit in the 
combatant status104, IHL only contains provisions implying that killings may be 
lawful at times, but there is no express legal support for that assumption. Consi-
dering that IHL is a regime mostly delimited by prohibitions, those who support 
the right to kill argue that there is no rule prohibiting an enemy combatant from 
being targeted105 and that the silence should be interpreted as an authorization, 
resulting in a minimum protection -if any- of their right to life. Even the most 
fervent supporters of this assumption, however, should acknowledge that the 
extent to which this right should be watered down cannot be determined clearly 
from the text of the IHL rules, because of the lack thereof. This, in my view, 
opens the door for other possible readings of these norms.
3.3. existinG interPretations oF tHe riGHt to liFe durinG arMed 
      conFlict
While IHRL offers permanent and mostly unrestricted protection of the right 
to life to all individuals, IHL makes remarkable distinctions between individuals 
and offers a lower degree of protection that varies among the different categories. 
These contrasts result also in differences regarding the principles governing the 
use of force. Under IHRL, the use of lethal force is lawful only on an exceptional 
basis to deter an imminent danger106, must be aligned to a LHM approach107 
and followed by an investigation108. Conversely, IHL assumes that the high le-
vels of violence in armed conflicts require force to be used on a sustained basis 
and, hence, it is more willing to deem it legal on the basis of military necessity, 
often without even requiring investigation109. All these divergences need to be 
addressed through an appropriate model of IHL-IHRL interaction, to create an 
adequate and coherent standard of protection regarding the right to life. 
101  III Geneva Convention. Arts. 13,14,42,52,121. 
102  Additional Protocol I. Art. 41.
103  Cfr. Melzer, Nils. “Targeted Killing or Less Harmful...” Óp. cit., p. 10
104   Cfr. Parks, Hays. “Part IX of the ICRC ...” Óp. cit., ; Watkin, Kenneth. “Humans in the Cross- Hairs: Targeting, 
Assassination...” Óp. cit.
105  Ibíd. 
106 ECtHR, McCann and Others v UK App. 18984/91 (1995) paras. 202-213; ECtHR, Ergi v. Turkey App. 850/1057 (1998) 
para. 79; ECtHR, Isayeva v Russia App. 57950/00 (2005) para. 189; Principles of Firearms… Óp. cit., Principles 9 and 10. 
107  Cfr. Droege, Cordula. “Elective affinities? Human rights and humanitarian...” Óp. cit., p. 32.
108  Ibíd.
109  Ibíd. p. 25.
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3.3.1. traditional aPProacH: nuclear weaPons judGeMent
The traditional approach to the right to life in armed conflicts was built employing 
the model of reading IHRL in the light of IHL, which was discussed in the first 
chapter. Under this model, the notion of arbitrariness regarding a deprivation of 
life in IHRL is defined by the relevant IHL norms. This approach was used first 
by the ICJ in the 1996 Advisory Opinion on Nuclear Weapons, when the court 
stated: “In principle, the right not to be arbitrarily deprived of one’s life applies also 
in hostilities. The test of what is an arbitrary deprivation of life, however, then falls 
to be determined by the applicable lex specialis, namely, the law applicable in armed 
conflict [IHL]”110. Since then, this has been the interpretation par excellence of the 
right to life during wartime, which was later ratified by the 2004 Palestinian Wall 
judgement111, by the 2004 General Comment 31 of the Human Rights Commit-
tee (onwards HRC)112 and by other international bodies. 
However, the difficulty presented by this approach is that the IHL protection regar-
ding the right to life would stay unchanged by IHRL, leaving the latter excluded 
from the regulation of hostilities in practice113. Moreover, putting IHL in the po-
sition of defining IHRL rules, would undoubtedly require the former’s rules to be 
straight forward about its own standards and, as was analysed in previous sections, 
IHL is far from crystal clear on the matter114. This approach is, thus, inadequate. 
3.3.2. More recent aPProacHes: tHe inteGratiVe Model
The alternative approach here proposed is in application of the integrative model 
discussed in chapter 1, reading IHL under the light of IHRL principles. It aims 
at understanding the protective IHRL values of the right to life as spreading 
into armed conflicts, strengthening the protection offered by IHL and, thus, 
toughening the requirements established for the use of force115.  This would not 
be in complete contradiction with the solution adopted by the Nuclear Weapons 
Judgement because the suggested approach would still derive from IHL rules as 
lex specialis and not from IHRL standards. The only variation would be that the 
IHRL rules would affect the structure of the reasoning employed for interpre-
tation. Instead of reading the IHL rules in the same mechanical way they have 
been interpreted traditionally, this approach intends to read the relevant norms 
in a way that offers the lives of combatants a certain degree of protection if their 
killings are not pursuant to necessary military objectives. 
110  ICJ, Nuclear weapons… Óp. cit., para. 24.
111 ICJ, Palestinian wall… Óp. cit., para. 106.
112  HRC General Comment 31… Óp. cit. para. 11.
113  Cfr. Rusinova, Vera  “The right to life in light of the integration...” Óp. cit., p. 8.
114  Cfr. Doswald-Beck, Louise. “The right to life…” Óp. cit., p. 2.
115  Cfr. Rusinova, Vera  “The right to life in light of the integration...” Óp. cit., p. 8-9.
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This will translate mainly into limitations of the legal use of force in the con-
duct of hostilities that, without conceptually deeming every killing of a com-
batant illegal, will aim at lessening the lethal risks that combatants are exposed 
to and hopefully reducing the number of casualties. In other words, a LHM 
approach would be injected to the IHL regime. This would better match the 
trend established towards an international legal framework that is increasingly 
more respectful of IHRL and, even if it would impose heavier obligations on 
states, the latter have proven through their acquiescence to the emergence of 
new treaties and their willingness to establish and be abided by new IHRL bo-
dies and procedures in the recent years, that this would be a suitable next step 
in IHL interpretation. 
Academics have suggested various other ways to achieve this same protective goal, 
generally through the insertion of IHRL normative elements in the regulation of 
war. For instance, Droege116 and Sassoli117 have suggested that some areas within an 
armed conflict that may more likely resemble a situation of peace due to the physi-
cal distance with the battlefield or to its disconnection with the military objectives, 
should have IHRL as the lex specialis and, hence, all operations undertaken there 
should abide by the more strict rules of Law Enforcement Operations118. According 
to Droege, this would offer a higher standard of protection to individuals affected 
by the armed conflict, which is the same goal pursued with the model here pro-
posed119. However, the problem with this solution is that, conceptually, it would 
depart from the systemic approach that guides International Law and, instead, 
would give way to parallel isolated regimes expected to apply alternatively and open 
the door for discretionary -and even arbitrary- determinations of applicability120. 
Furthermore, this solution entrusts IHRL with the task of governing areas affected 
by armed conflict with its own rules, which may often not accommodate to the 
needs of war and impose impracticable duties. These norms could eventually lapse 
into disuse and, ultimately, weaken the rule of law overall. 
The benefit of using the integrative model here suggested, is that it provides a 
more consistent theory that aims to regulate the entirety of the conduct of hos-
tilities through the one regime that was created for that purpose, namely IHL, 
while allowing the influence of IHRL to humanize the standards of protection. 
Because of the convenience of this approach specially regarding LHM, there 
are already two judgements that have applied similar rationales at the national 
level. The first one refers to the 2006 Judgement of the Supreme Court of Is-
rael on the Targeted Killings case, which was concerned with the anti-terrorist 
policy of targeted killings undertaken by the Israeli government in places like 
116  Cfr. Droege, Cordula. “Elective affinities? Human rights and humanitarian...” Óp. cit.  
117  Cfr. Sassoli, Marco and Olson, Laura “The relationship between international humanitarian...” Óp. cit. 
118 Ibid p. 15, Cfr. Droege, Cordula. “Elective affinities? Human rights and humanitarian...” Óp. cit., p. 30-35. 
119  Cfr. Droege, Cordula. “Elective affinities? Human rights and humanitarian...” Óp. cit., p. 39.
120  Cfr. Kleffner, Jann. “Section IX of the ICRC Interpretative Guidance…” Óp. cit., p. 18.
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Judea, Samaria and the Gaza Strip in the context of an armed conflict121.  Here 
the Supreme Court established that, because of the lack of clarity in the IHL 
norms, there were a few additional conditions that needed to be fulfilled for the 
policy to be deemed legal, including that the individuals targeted could not be 
attacked if “less harmful means can be employed”122. The court furthered this 
argument by stating that “among the military means, one must use the means 
whose harm to the human rights of the harmed person is smallest”; thus if an 
individual “can be arrested, interrogated and tried, those are the means which 
should be employed”123. In this judgement, the Supreme Court derived this 
standard from the principle of proportionality found in Israeli national legisla-
tion but, as was stated before, the notion of LHM is one that resembles IHRL 
standards124. Hence, even though here the court employed national law in its 
rationale, the remarkable aspect of it is that it used a more protective rule to 
shine through the IHL norm and guide its interpretation, so as to increase the 
standards of protection even in favour of belligerents125. 
The second example is a resolution of the National Human Rights Commission 
of Nepal126 which dealt with an armed attack perpetrated by the national security 
forces against a group of Maoists, who had been forcing students and professors 
at a school to be indoctrinated through their “cultural programme”. In this in-
cident, when the security forces arrived to the place, they surrounded the five 
insurgents and opened fire, causing six of them and five children to be killed. 
The Commission determined that the state agents should have given a warning 
and attempted to arrest the Maoists first, especially since the latter did not fire 
back at the security forces nor they were even significantly armed127. Hence, the 
Commission determined that there had been a violation of IHL128. Although it 
did not mention expressly where the LHM approach derived from, it did make 
several references to human rights and, ultimately, endorsed a flexible interpreta-
tion of IHL that contrasted with the classic one129. 
These two judgments endorse a LHM approach in the context of armed conflicts. 
Of course, these are not means that can always be used but they should always be 
considered as a first option. If the conditions allow and they do not presuppose 
significant additional danger to soldiers or civilians, non-lethal means should 
be employed130. This idea was also endorsed by the HRC in the Concluding 
121  High Court of Justice Israel, Targeted Killings… Óp. cit., para. 2.
122  Ibíd para. 40.
123  Ibíd.
124 Cfr. Ben-Naftali, Orna. ‘A Judgment in the Shadow of International Criminal Law’, 5 J ICL (2007) 322. 
125  Cfr. Melzer, Nils. “Targeted Killing or Less Harmful...” Óp. cit., p. 6.
126 Cfr. Poudyal, Kedar Prasad. The role of national human rights institutions in armed conflict situations, with special reference to 




130  High Court of Justice Israel, Targeted killings… Óp. cit., para. 40.
254 • Septiembre 2018
Gabriela Monserrat Flores Villacís
Observations on the Reports of Israel in 2003 and 2010131. Similarly, here the 
Committee noted that “before resorting to the use of deadly force, all measures 
to arrest a person […] must be exhausted”132. 
Although the situations addressed in these resolutions involved civilians parti-
cipating in hostilities and not combatants specifically, the same rationale can be 
applied to the latter133. The reason behind a LHM approach is to protect the lives 
of the individuals that are being targeted pursuant to respecting their human dig-
nity, but irrespective of the function they perform. Consequently, this rationale 
makes even more sense when dealing with combatants because they are indivi-
duals who have not forfeited their rights and who are definitely the most directly 
affected by the dangers of war; this increased vulnerability, thus, should make 
them receive at least the same protection as other participants134. Moreover, IHL’s 
intrinsic intention has always been to afford protections for all individuals affec-
ted by armed conflicts -including combatants- and prevent avoidable suffering135. 
Accordingly, the protective rationale presented by these resolutions should also 
be extended to combatants in the form explained in the next chapter. 
4. least HarMFul Means as a PrinciPle GuidinG arMed conFlicts
In order to understand this proposal, one needs to renounce to preconceptions 
that have governed classic IHL interpretation and, instead, be willing to analyse 
IHL lex lata with an IHRL-lead approach, in search for the most protective rules 
upon which to construe a human-centred interpretation of the entire regime. In 
this regard, first it is important to highlight that the starting point of IHL ever 
since its emergence, is that within an armed conflict “the only legitimate object 
which states should endeavour to accomplish […] is to weaken the military for-
ces of the enemy”136, as stated in the 1868 St. Petersburg Declaration. This same 
norm was later embodied in rules of the Hague Regulations (onwards HR) and 
the APs, stating that “[t]he right of belligerents to adopt means of injuring the 
enemy is not unlimited”137. This principle is inherently incompatible with the 
traditional notion of an unfettered right to kill combatants, because it suggests 
that even persons not expressly entitled to protection against direct attack, na-
131  HRC, Concluding Observations, Israel, CCPR/C/ISR/CO/3, 29/07/2010, 10, www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrc/docs/
CCPR.C.ISR.CO.3.doc (accessed: august 2016).
132 HRC, Concluding Observations, Israel, CCPR/CO/78/ISR 21-08-2003, 15, http://www.adalah.org/uploads/oldfiles/upfiles/
ConcludingObservations/HRC-Concluding%20Observations%20(2003).pdf (accessed: august 2016).
133  Cfr. Melzer, Nils. “Targeted Killing or Less Harmful...” Óp. cit., p. 6.
134 Cfr. May, Larry. “Humanity, Necessity and the...” Óp. cit., p. 25.
135 Cfr. Forsythe, David. The Humanitarians: The International Committee of the Red Cross. Cambridge University Press, 2005. 
 
136  St Petersburg Declaration Preamble.
137  Hague Convention (IV) Respecting the Las and Customs of War on Land and its annex: Regulations Concerning the Laws 
and Customs of War on Land (adopted 18 October 1907) 36 STAT 2277 (HR-IV). Art. 22; API Art. 35.
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mely enemy combatants, have some safeguards foreseen by IHL138. Today, the 
latter is still a guiding principle of this body of law and, because of its powerful 
protective outlook, it should be the basis of this analysis139.  
In this sense, it is perfectly legitimate to use force against the enemy within the 
context of an armed conflict, but only to the extent necessary to defeat him and 
achieve the military objective sought, because the acts that exceed this standard 
would be considered inhumane140. The amount of force used and the extent of 
damage inflicted against enemy soldiers should be restrained by those objectives, 
which cannot include the extermination of enemy combatants as one of them141. 
At times, killing may be an unavoidable result of the use of force within hostili-
ties, especially in cases of actual combat, self-defence or defence of fellow soldiers; 
but it should be evaded when LHM are feasible and would suffice to weaken the 
enemy. Killing should only be employed when it is essential to accomplish mili-
tary purposes, and not merely to avoid military inconveniences142. 
The ICRC in its 2009 Interpretative Guidance clearly established this rule: “The 
kind and degree of force which is permissible against persons not entitled to protec-
tion against direct attack must not exceed what is actually necessary to accomplish 
a legitimate military purpose in the prevailing circumstances”143. This statement 
encompasses the interpretation that this paper endorses. Nevertheless, it should be 
noted that it has been heavily criticized by states and by a part of the legal doctrine 
because, it is submitted, it lacks foundation within IHL144. The intention of this 
article, however, is to support this understanding not based on IHL rules alone, but 
in IHL norms interpreted in light of IHRL. The novel element of this proposal is 
that, through the intervention of the latter, IHL rules are read in a human-centred 
and not in a military-convenient way, through the highlighting of the protective 
norms contained already in IHL, namely the prohibition of superfluous injury or 
unnecessary suffering, the principle of military necessity and the prohibition of 
assassination. These rules deny the possibility of an unfettered right to kill and, ins-
tead, suggest a LHM approach for the conduct of hostilities.  In the next sections, 
I will analyse each one of these rules in more detail. 
4.1. ProHibition oF suPerFluous injury or unnecessary suFFerinG 
138  Cfr. ICRC, Conference of Government Experts on the Reaffirmation and Development of International Humanitarian Law 
Applicable in Armed Conflicts, ii (1974) CE/COM I1I/C 3; ICRC, ‘Weapons that May Cause Unnecessary Suffering or Have 
Indiscriminate Effects: Report on the Work of Experts’ (1973) cited in Goodman, Ryan. ‘The Power to Kill or Capture Enemy 
Combatants’ (2013) 24 EJIL 819 p. 23-30. 
139  Cfr. Goodman, Ryan. ‘The Power to Kill or Capture Enemy...” Óp. cit., p. 18.
140 Ibíd p. 19.
141  Ibíd p. 20.
142 Ibíd p. 5.
143  ICRC, Interpretative Guidance on the Notion of Direct… Óp. cit.,  p. 81. 
144  Cfr. Parks, Hays. “Part IX of the ICRC ‘Direct Participation in...” Óp. cit.; Ohlin, Jens David. ‘The Duty to Capture’, 97 
Minnesota Law Review (2013) 1268.
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This is a principle first found in the St. Petersburg Declaration and in the HR, 
initially aimed at excluding the use of weapons that “uselessly aggravate the su-
ffering of disabled men or render their death inevitable”145. Recently, however, it 
was expanded and incorporated in API, not only directed to limit the means of 
warfare but also the methods146. In 1996, this principle was qualified by the ICJ as 
an intransgressible one, aimed at preventing “greater harm than that unavoidable 
to achieve legitimate military objectives”147. The goal is to offer protection from 
excessive pain to all individuals, without regard for the status they hold. 
As Melzer has explained, the value of this principle is that it evidences the protec-
tive values that are incorporated into IHL norms and that are often disregarded148. 
This rule hints that a LHM principle could also be present as part of the IHL rules 
and that operations should be directed at rendering belligerents hors de combat and 
not at killing them, because the latter would constitute unnecessary suffering. 
4.2. PrinciPle oF Military necessity 
If we apply the ideas derived from the previous principle, the question remains 
as to how could the LHM notion operate within a context of wartime, without 
forfeiting military objectives in favour of protective goals. In IHL there are two 
principles that represent these interests: on the one hand, that of military ne-
cessity and, on the other, the principle of humanity149. Traditionally, it has been 
assumed that the first one is the “justifying factor inherent in all rules of IHL” 
which excuses the resort to violent measures during an armed conflict that would 
not be acceptable during peacetime150. The second one operates as a counterpart 
of the latter and is founded on the value of human dignity and in the need to 
respect others -including enemies-, injecting a common sense of humaneness 
into the battlefield. Finding a consensus on the balance between these interests, 
however, has proven to be very complex and the solutions offered by the classic 
approaches, often involved the principle of humanity being sacrificed151. Under 
this scheme, a LHM idea would seem unfit. 
However, there is an emerging trend of understanding military necessity not only 
as a permissive principle, but also as a restrictive one with elements of humanity 
within it152. Military necessity was first defined by the 1863 Lieber Code as “the 
necessity of those measures which are indispensable for securing the ends of the 
war, and which are lawful according to the modern law and usages of war”153 and 
145 St Petersburg Declaration.
146 Hague Convention (IV) Art. 23; Additional Protocol I Art. 35.2.
147  ICJ, Nuclear Weapons... Óp. cit., para. 78. 
148  Cfr. Melzer, Nills. “Targeted Killing or Less Harmful...” Óp. cit., p.12.
149  St. Petersburg Declaration.
150  Cfr. Melzer, Nils. “Targeted Killing or Less Harmful...” Óp. cit., p. 19.
151  Ibíd p. 15.
152  Ibíd p. 23.
153  Lieber Code (1863).
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this definition is accepted even today. This two-sided concept conditions opera-
tions in two ways: first, they must be crucial for the achievement of a military 
purpose and, second, they cannot be prohibited by IHL. Thus, military necessity 
does not justify every conduct, but only the ones that fulfil the requirements 
mentioned154. Since those are two cumulative requirements, killings contrary to 
IHL’s positive norms can never be justified by considerations of military neces-
sity, but more importantly, those without manifest military necessity cannot be 
justified, even if they are not proscribed under IHL155. This principle, therefore, 
also advocates for the LHM approach here presented156. 
4.3. ProHibition oF assassination
This rule is founded on a traditional IHL concept that was established in the HR, 
reflecting a code of honour between combatants: treachery157. This included not 
only perfidy as defined today in Art. 37 of API, but also an express prohibition of 
assassination in the following terms: ‘‘it is especially forbidden... to kill or wound 
treacherously individuals belonging to the hostile nation or army’’158.  
This prohibition, according to Oppenheim, has the following implications: “no 
assassin must be hired, and no assassination of combatants be committed; a price 
may not be put on the head of an enemy individual; proscription and outlawing 
are prohibited; no treacherous request for quarter must be made”159. Thus, the 
intention of this prohibition was to outlaw the possibility of setting assassination 
as one of the goals to be achieved within an armed conflict, because of the bar-
baric implications that this idea entails160. Evidently this norm is not an absolute 
prohibition because that would be incompatible with the realities of war, but it 
does suggest that assassination should not be a legitimate military objective and 
that it should be avoided to a certain extent. Consequently, this rule excludes 
killing as the default military strategy and provides support for a LHM approach. 
Some authors, nevertheless, have argued that this rule is not applicable in today’s 
conduct of hostilities because of the different type of tactics and warfare emplo-
yed161. They claim that a century ago when the HR were elaborated, the usual 
strategy involved close fighting between combatants in the front line, whereas 
today a significant number of attacks are undertaken at a distance, especially 
through drone warfare162. Following this rationale, some states have departed 
154  Cfr. Melzer, Nils. “Targeted Killing or Less Harmful...” Óp. cit., p. 28.
155  Ibíd. 
156 Ibíd p. 22.
157 Hague Convention (IV) Art. 23b.
158  Ibíd.
159 Oppenheim, Lassa. International Law, Vol. II, Disputes, War and Neutrality. Longman’s, Green & Co. 1952. p. 341.  
160  Cfr. Westlake, John. International Law, Part II, War. CUP, 1907. p. 75.  
161  Cfr. Doswald-Beck, Louise. “The right to life…” Óp. cit., p 21-22.
162  Ibíd.
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from the Hague rule and have removed the assassination prohibitions from their 
military manuals asserting that it doesn’t adapt to modern conditions163. Never-
theless, this prohibition represents one of the most human-centred norms of IHL 
and should not be disregarded out of military convenience. More importantly, 
from a legal perspective, this posture is adopted in breach of the mentioned Ha-
gue rule, which is still binding on all states in virtue of its customary nature164. 
4.4. lHM aPPlied in arMed conFlict
By understanding that war’s only legitimate goal is defeating the enemy and by 
applying the prohibition of superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering, the pro-
hibition of assassination and the principle of military necessity in its restrictive 
form, IHL acquires a different approach to the conduct of hostilities. If these 
norms are allowed a leading role in the determination of protections in favour of 
the life of combatants and in the reading of more operative rules, IHL is capable 
of affording a balanced solution regarding the use of force.
Accordingly, under the scheme proposed, the fact that IHL is silent regarding 
combatant’s protections from attacks, can no longer be interpreted as giving way 
to an unconstrained right to kill. Moreover, according to the Martens Clause, in 
the cases not envisaged by the treaties, “civilians and combatants remain under 
the protection and authority of the principles of humanity and from the dic-
tates of public conscience”165. This notion was furthered by the ICTY, stating 
that “anytime a rule of IHL is not sufficiently rigorous or precise […] the scope 
and purport of the rule must be defined with reference to those principles and 
dictates”166. Consequently, the lack of either a prohibition or an authorization of 
attacks on combatants, cannot be understood as an endorsement of the right to 
kill but, at most, it can be read as permitting the use of force that is reasonably 
necessary to achieve legitimate military objectives167. Furthermore, Art. 57 of 
API manifestly authorizes attacks on military objectives only in the cases where 
they offer a “definite military advantage”168. In this respect, it would be nonsensi-
cal to interpret that IHL meant to set a higher standard of protection for objects 
than for individuals. Hence, the use of force used against combatants will also 
need to be subject -at least- to an equivalent rule. 
This approach is not intended to impose unrealistic restrictions or to put ex-
cessive risks on the armed forces. It simply compels parties not to cause more 
damage to the enemy than is strictly required. This translates into the armed 
163  Cfr. The Manual of the Law of Armed Conflict, UK Ministry of Defence. OUP, 2004. 
164  Nüremberg International Military Tribunal, Judgment on the Trial of German Major War Criminals (1946) reprinted in AJIL, 
Vol. 41, 1947, p. 248-249.
165 Additionaln Protocol I. Art. 1.2.
166  ICTY, Prosecutor v Kupreskic Case No. IT-95-16-T-14, (January 2000) para. 525. 
167  Cfr. Melzer, Nils. “Targeted Killing or Less Harmful...” Óp. cit., p. 24.
168  Additionaln Protocol I. Art. 57.
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forces’ obligation to always consider LHM options first, when planning military 
operations. This is an assessment that needs to be done in the circumstances of 
each operation in concrete, based on the conditions prevailing at the time and 
with enough flexibility for error when judging a military commander’s judge-
ment on the matter169.  
4.4.1. wHen is tHe lHM aPProacH to be aPPlied? 
This interpretation of IHL rules is undertaken under the light of IHRL prin-
ciples and, therefore, it has to be aligned with the rules of application of the 
latter. In other words, only when IHRL is applicable to a determined situation, 
the proposed approach will be available. As was established in the previous 
chapter, IHRL obligations emerge whenever a state has jurisdiction, within 
state boarders as well as outside of them. In this regard, the territorial model of 
jurisdiction will mostly operate during NIACs and military occupations, and 
the personal model will operate during other kinds of IACs. Negative obliga-
tions regarding the right to life, namely the prohibition of deprivations of life, 
are triggered under both models170. 
Whenever a state has territorial control over the entirety or a part of the terri-
tory of another state during an armed conflict, this interpretation of IHL should 
operate. Similarly, when a state is perpetrating military operations abroad but 
without territorial control, and its agents have de facto power over an individual, 
the interpretation here proposed should apply. To exemplify how the personal 
model of extraterritoriality operates, I will use Ryan Goodman’s interpretation171 
of a soldier hors de combat. According to Art. 41.1 of AP1, a combatant who has 
been put hors de combat “shall not be made the object of attack”172. In this respect, 
Goodman sustains that when Art. 41.2.a includes any person “in the power of 
the enemy” as part of this category, this should be interpreted to include also the 
moment prior to capture when the individual is already de facto in the power of 
the adversary173. He suggests that this was the intention of the wording of Art. 
41.2.a, which departed from the text of similar provisions in previous IHL trea-
ties174. He uses this approach to justify LHM from an IHL perspective, arguing 
that enemy combatants against whom a  military operation is perpetrated are “in 
the power” of the offensive armed forces, also the moments prior to the attack 
and thus, if possible, should be captured and not forcefully attacked or killed 
in light of Art. 41. Goodman’s interpretation of “in the power of the enemy” 
matches the cause-effect approach presented earlier regarding the personal model 
169  Cfr. Melzer, Nils. “Targeted Killing or Less Harmful...” Óp. cit., p. 27-28.
170  Cfr. King, Hugh “The extraterritorial Human Rights Obligations…” Óp. cit., p. 32-36.
171  Cfr. Goodman, Ryan. ‘The Power to Kill or Capture Enemy...” Óp. cit., p. 13.
172  API. Art. 41.1.   
173 Cfr. Goodman, Ryan. ‘The Power to Kill or Capture Enemy...” Óp. cit., p. 14; ICRC, Commentary on Additional Protocols... 
Óp. cit., para. 1602.
174 Ibíd. 
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of extraterritoriality, which only requires a de facto power or authority over an 
individual to trigger IHRL obligations175. Using this same scheme, then, it can 
be said that the LHM approach proposed would operate every time a combatant 
is “in the power of the enemy”.
In modern wars today, however, hostilities take place not only in the form 
of close fighting on the ground but also from a distance by drone warfare176. 
In this regard, IHRL obligations would also be binding under the notion of 
extraterritorial IHRL jurisdiction presented earlier. In these cases, it is unde-
niable that the state party perpetrating the attacks from a distance would have 
de facto power over the adversary, namely the power to kill, irrespective of the 
lack of physical apprehension177. Accordingly, uses of force would also need to 
be guided by a LHM principle. This does not mean that distant attacks could 
not take place, but that they should be undertaken in a way that causes the 
least harm possible to the enemy fighters and only employed when there is a 
concrete military advantage at stake. 
5. conclusion
The proposal contained on this paper, intends to offer an alternative way of 
understanding the IHL-IHRL relation, which results in a LHM approach that 
limits the use of force legally accepted in the conduct of hostilities. The moti-
vation for the change proposed is found in the recent configuration of IHRL as 
an essential element within the international community which, procedurally, 
demands a reconsideration of the classic model of interaction of these two regi-
mes that privileged IHL and, substantially, requires the incorporation of higher 
standards of protection of the rights of the individuals participating in the armed 
conflict, namely combatants. The biggest advantage of this proposal is that it 
derives not from the insertion of rules alien to the conduct of hostilities, but 
from IHL norms themselves, specifically the prohibition of superfluous injury or 
unnecessary suffering, the principle of military necessity and the prohibition of 
assassination. This novel reading of IHL dissolves what Melzer calls the “outdated 
juridical myth”178 of an unconstrained right to kill enemy fighters and, instead, 
allows uses of lethal force only when they are required to achieve a definite mili-
tary advantage. 
Admittedly, the proposed application of the LHM principle will present compli-
cations for states in the conduct of hostilities at every level. These difficulties will 
range from determining what the required standard of military necessity is in the 
context of a specific operation, to the additional precautions that commanders 
175 Cfr. King, Hugh “The extraterritorial Human Rights Obligations…” Óp. cit., p. 35-36.
176  Cfr. Doswald-Beck, Louise. “The right to life…” Óp. cit., p. 24.
177 Cfr. King, Hugh “The extraterritorial Human Rights Obligations…” Óp. cit., p. 32.
178  Melzer, Nils. “Targeted Killing or Less Harmful...” Óp. cit., p. 28.
